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Abstract
We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-
Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which
each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each
voter can vote in favour of one candidate and against another one. The
weights attached to positive and negative votes in calculating a candidate’s
net score may be different, so that a negative vote and a positive vote need
not cancel out exactly. These rules combine the first-place seeking incentives
of plurality with the incentives to avoid being ranked last of antiplurality. We
show that these rules generally admit equilibria, which are nonconvergent if
and only if the importance of a positive vote exceeds that of a negative vote.
The set of equilibria in the latter case is very similar to that of plurality,
except that the platforms are less extreme due to the moderating effect of
negative votes. Moreover, any degree of dispersion between plurality, at one
extreme, and full convergence, at the other, can be attained for the correct
choice of the weights.
1 Introduction
Hotelling’s (1929) “Main Street” model of spatial competition between firms
has—most notably thanks to its adaptation by Downs (1957) to ideological com-
petition of political parties—enjoyed a significant presence in political science
literature. In the classical model, there is a society of voters whose ideal policy
platforms lie along the left-right political spectrum. A set of exogenously given
political candidates or parties choose platforms to advocate so as to maximise
their support from the voters, who vote for the candidate with the platform
nearest to his or her personal ideal platform.
Most such studies of Downsian competition have focused on situations in which
elections are held under the voting system known as plurality rule. This is the sim-
plest system where voters have one vote each, which they cast for their favourite
candidate, and whoever gets the most votes wins. Under plurality, voters’ sec-
ond, third and other preferences—and most importantly for this paper, their last
preferences—do not matter. However, voting systems, both used in practice and
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studied theoretically, are diverse. Many of them do take into account voters’
partial or full ranking of candidates when producing a winner. These include,
among others, approval voting, Borda count, and single transferable vote. When
the preferences beyond first matter, candidates’ incentives change, and we expect
equilibrium outcomes to vary as well. In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium
properties of a largely overlooked class of voting rules, which combine positive and
negative voting, and are referred to as best-worst rules (Garc´ıa-Lapresta et al.,
2010). Under these rules, voters have both one positive and one negative vote,
whose weights (in absolute value) are allowed to be different, while their inter-
mediate preferences are inconsequential. Plurality, anti-plurality, and the system
in which voters have one positive and one negative vote of equal absolute value,1
are special cases.
The main result of this paper is that in the Hotelling-Downs model there is
a close link between the pure-strategy equilibria of general best-worst rules and
those of plurality, which is well known to admit divergent equilibria in which
candidates adopt a range of ideologically diverse positions (Eaton and Lipsey,
1975; Denzau et al., 1985). When the importance of a positive vote exceeds that
of a negative vote, equilibria take the same general form as those of plurality,
with divergent policy platforms advocated. However, the key difference is that,
while differentiated, the equilibrium platforms for the best-worst rules are more
moderate and less spread out. Indeed, these rules present candidates with a clear
centrifugal motive to seek first-place rankings, as occurs under plurality, but
with the simultaneous incentive to avoid being the most unpopular candidate
and receiving negative votes. This last property encourages a degree of policy
moderation—adopting extreme platforms is discouraged as doing so is likely to
single oneself out as a target for the negative votes of voters at the opposite end of
the ideological spectrum. As the importance of a negative vote increases relative
to that of a positive vote, the equilibrium platforms move inwards towards the
median voter’s ideal platform. Eventually all platforms merge at the median
as a negative vote reaches parity with a positive vote (i.e., one negative vote
cancels out one positive vote exactly). When a negative vote becomes more
important than a positive vote, only convergent equilibria exist, with no policy
differentiation.
Describing the equilibrium properties of different voting systems is an impor-
tant task for several reasons. When choosing between voting rules, first of all,
we would like to know whether or not equilibria exist—their absence may lead to
permanent instability and a lack of predictability of outcomes (Myerson, 1999).
Second, if they exist, an electoral designer would prefer a rule that admits equilib-
ria with desirable properties. The main consideration here is a tradeoff between
discouraging extremism and promoting fair representation—it is undesirable if
extremist platforms have a better chance of attracting votes than more centrist
platforms, while at the same time the rational for voting in the first place is to
provide citizens with the ability to choose parties or politicians that represent
their varied interests.
1Also known as “single-positive-and-single-negative” voting (Myerson, 1999).
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Our results show that best-worst rules do well on both counts. They admit
nonconvergent equilibria, offering voters with a choice over different platforms and
avoiding Hotelling’s “excessive sameness”. At the same time, the perhaps exces-
sive extremism associated with plurality (Cox, 1987, 1985; Myerson and Weber,
1993; Laslier and Maniquet, 2010) is moderated. Indeed, depending on the weight
placed on a negative vote, we may have any level of dispersion of platforms be-
tween that of plurality, at one extreme, and full convergence of positions, at the
other. Moreover, they are simple and easily implementable.
The idea of voting against candidates has been around for some time. Boehm
(1976) in an unpublished essay suggested that voters in an election be allowed
either to cast a vote for or against a candidate, but not both. A candidate’s
“negative” votes would be subtracted from his “positive” votes to determine his
net vote, and the candidate with the highest net vote would win.2 Boehm—and
many others after him (see, e.g., Leef, 2014)—argued that the introduction of
negative votes in United States presidential elections would force the candidates
to appeal to voters with positive programs, rather than just filling the airwaves
with ads attacking other candidates, sowing doubt among their supporters. The
rule suggested by Boehm is now known as negative voting (Brams, 1983). Anti-
plurality voting is a similar method in which each voter votes against a single
candidate, and the candidate with the fewest votes against wins. In other words,
anti-plurality determines who among the candidates is the least unpopular.3
The use of some form of negative voting in elections is not so uncommon.
For example, Nevada gives voters the option to vote against all candidates by
having a “None of these candidates” option on the ballot. Prior to 2000, Lithua-
nian voters were allowed voters to express approval, neutrality or disapproval of
candidates in the proportional representation part of their parliamentary elec-
tions (Renwick and Pilet, 2016). The Senate of Spain uses a rule related to
anti-plurality (Grofman and Lijphart, 1986)—provinces elect four senators, and
voters may vote for any three.4
The possibility of casting both positive and negative votes, as occurs under
best-worst rules, may be even more advantageous. First, the number of ways in
which voters can express themselves is further diversified, which could increase
turnout by appealing to those voters who are enticed more by the ability to vote
against a candidate than for one (Kang, 2010; Leef, 2014). Second, it can give
a fighting chance to major or minor centrist parties—it is not unthinkable that
people on the extreme left will vote for a leftist candidate and against a right-
wing one, while the right-wing voters will do the opposite. Their votes will cancel
out and a centrist candidate will be elected.5
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we outline some
2Presumably, if the highest net vote is negative, then nobody is elected.
3Anti-plurality is also sometimes referred to as negative voting as well as “veto” (Kang,
2010).
4More accurately, this is closer to k-plurality, where voters have k votes to cast, since the
number of candidates could exceed four. Also, the Spanish method is more complicated in that
it allows for abstention.
5See Kang (2010) for an account of more costs, benefits and tradeoffs associated with negative
voting.
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literature related to this work; in Section 3 we present the model; in Section 4
we present our main results; Section 5 provides our concluding remarks. A few
minor and auxiliary results are presented in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Best-worst rules specifically and notions related to them have been considered
in the literature before in other contexts. The idea that the best and worst
alternatives play a special role in the decision process has been prominent in
decision theory. For example, the Arrow-Hurwicz (1972) criterion for choice
under uncertainty takes a weighted average of the best and worst expected
value/utility outcomes and does not take into account intermediate outcomes, and
Marley and Louviere (2005) look at probabilistic discrete choice models through
the best-worst lense.
Garc´ıa-Lapresta et al. (2010) provide an axiomatic characterisation of the
class of best-worst voting rules considered in this paper. Alcantud and Laruelle
(2014) characterise a related voting rule in which, for each candidate, voters
may express approval, indifference, or disapproval. This rule is also studied in
Felsenthal (1989) from the perspective of voter strategies. Joy and McMunigal
(2016) believe that the current system of peremptory challenges in the criminal
justice system of the United States makes it easy to exclude qualified African
Americans jurors in the process of jury selection and propose that it be replaced
with a system of peremptory strikes and peremptory inclusions. In other words,
both the defense and the prosecution should be allowed to not just rule potential
jurors out, but also “rule them in”.
None of these papers, however, look at how the incentives created by these
voting systems affect political competition. Given the very natural combination
of negative and positive voting embodied in the best-worst rules, it is surpris-
ing that, to the best of our knowledge, they have been overlooked in the spatial
competition literature. There are, however, a few results related to some special
cases of best-worst rules. Most notably, plurality has been extensively discussed,
and its equilibrium properties are characterised in Eaton and Lipsey (1975) and
Denzau et al. (1985). Anti-plurality is known to allow convergent equilibria in
which all candidates adopt the same policy platform, but not to allow noncon-
vergent equilibria (Cox, 1987).
The two most relevant papers to this research are Cox (1987) and Cahan and Slinko
(2016). Both are concerned with Nash equilibria under the class of voting rules
known as general scoring rules, of which the best-worst rules are a subclass. Cox
(1987) characterised all scoring rules that have convergent Nash equilibria, which
leads to a straightforward description of all best-worst rules allowing convergent
equilibria, as we will describe in Section 4. However, Cox’s theorem says noth-
ing about the possibility of divergent equilibria, which is the focus of the paper
Cahan and Slinko (2016) and also this paper.
Cahan and Slinko (2016) investigate the existence and properties of noncon-
vergent equilibria under general scoring rules. In some subclasses of scoring
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rules—in particular, those whose score vector is convex—they managed to char-
acterise all rules that allow Nash equilibria. These rules appear to be truncated
variants of the Borda rule. This result is, however, inapplicable to the best-worst
rules considered in this paper since their score vector is neither convex nor con-
cave. A general characterisation of scoring rules that allow equilibria remains an
open question.
3 The model
There is a unit mass of consumers distributed uniformly on the interval [0,1],
the issue space.6 There are m candidates—candidate i’s position is xi, and a
strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ [0, 1]
m describes the platforms of all the
candidates. A strategy profile implies a set of distinct occupied positions, x1 <
x2 < . . . < xq. We denote by ni the number of candidates at occupied position
xi and we will sometimes use the alternative notation for a strategy profile, x =
((x1, n1), . . . , (x
q, nq)), which gives the location and number of candidates at each
occupied position rather than each individual candidate’s position.
We will use notation [n] = {1, . . . , n} and if I = [a, b] is an interval, then
ℓ(I) = b− a is the length of the interval. We assume sincere voters with single-
peaked, symmetric utility functions who, hence, rank candidates according to the
distance between their advocated platform and the voter’s ideal position. Voters
who are indifferent between candidates decide on a strict ranking by fair lottery.
A best-worst voting rule can be described as follows: a first-place ranking earns
a candidate a normalised 1 point, while a last-place ranking earns the candidate
−c points, where c ≥ 0. Being ranked anywhere other than first or last by a voter
earns a candidate nothing. The magnitude of c describes the relative importance
of the positive vote relative to the negative vote, which is the parameter of interest
here. Thus, a rule can be described by a pair of numbers s = (c,m), where m is
the number of candidates.7
Candidate i’s score is the total number of weighted positive and negative votes
received, denoted vi(x). Candidates choose positions simultaneously so as to max-
imise vi(x).
8 Our equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
m) is an equilibrium if and only if vi(x
∗) ≥ vi(xi, x
∗
−i) for
all i ∈ [m] and for all xi ∈ [0, 1], where (xi, x
∗
−i) = (x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, xi, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
m).
A convergent Nash equilibrium (CNE) is an equilibrium in which all candidates
adopt the same platform, while in a non-convergent Nash equilibrium (NCNE),
at least two of the platforms are distinct.
6We do not actually need the distribution to be literally uniform. All we need is that the
candidates believe this to be the case or take it as a simplifying assumption in their decision-
making (Aragone`s and Xefteris, 2012; Cahan and Slinko, 2016).
7As noted in the Introduction, best-worst rules belong to the class of general scoring rules.
A scoring rule is a vector s = (s1, . . . , sm), where s1 ≥ · · · ≥ sm, s1 > sm, and si is the number
of points assigned to the i-th ranked candidate in a voter’s ballot. A best-worst rule s = (c,m),
then, is equivalent to scoring rule s = (1, 0, . . . , 0,−c).
8See Stigler’s (1972) argumentation for this assumption and a discussion of it in Denzau et al.
(1985).
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4 Results
Our main result is a general characterisation of NCNE for rules s = (c,m) in
Theorem 4.3. Before we concentrate on NCNE, however, we should address the
issue of CNE—equilibria in which all candidates adopt the same platform. In
fact, their characterisation is straightforward, presented below in Proposition
4.1. This result is due to Cox (1987), who characterised CNE for general scoring
rules, a broad class of voting rules to which best-worst rules belong.
Proposition 4.1 (Cox, 1987). A rule s = (c,m) admits CNE if and only
if c ≥ 1, in which case the profile x = ((x1,m)) is a CNE for any x1 ∈[
m−1+c
m(1+c) , 1−
m−1+c
m(1+c)
]
.
Proof. For x = ((x1,m)) to be a CNE, it should not be beneficial to deviate just to
the left or right of x1. That is, we have CNE if and only if: first, vi(x
1−, x−i) =
x1 − c(1 − x1) ≤ 1−c
m
= vi(x); and, second, vi(x
1+, x−i) = 1 − x
1 − cx1 ≤
vi(x). Together, these two conditions yield the interval of possible CNE, which
is nonempty if and only if c ≥ 1.
Proposition 4.1 tells us that CNE can only exist if the weight on a positive
vote does not exceed that of a negative vote. In this case, deviating differentiates
a candidate in a positive way for one side of the electorate, and negatively for the
other. The gain in terms of positive votes is not worth the damage due to the
negative votes that the candidate will now receive, so candidates will stay put at
the CNE platform. If c ≥ 1, then CNE exist at any point of an interval centered at
the median voter’s ideal position. As c increases, this interval expands, meaning
that a wider range of CNE are possible.9
While Proposition 4.1 tells us everything there is to know about CNE, it is
silent about NCNE.We do know that NCNE exist for plurality (Eaton and Lipsey,
1975), but not for antiplurality (Cox, 1987), both of which are examples of best-
worst rules, so the picture is not at all clear in general.
It turns out that, for NCNE to exist, it must be that c < 1. In other words,
the value of a positive vote must outweigh the value of a negative vote in order
for the candidates to be induced to adopt divergent policies, otherwise the cen-
tripetal incentive to avoid being singled out as the worst candidate is too strong
and only CNE can exist. This also implies that CNE and NCNE cannot exist
simultaneously for the same rule.10
Proposition 4.2. The rule s = (c,m) does not admit NCNE if c ≥ 1.
Proof. Consider candidate 1 at position x1, which is occupied by n1 candidates,
where 2 ≤ n1 ≤ m− 2. Consider intervals I1 = [0, x
1] and I2 = [(x
1 + xq)/2, 1].
If 1 makes an infinitesimal move to the right of x1, then in the rankings of voters
in I1, of which there is positive measure by Lemma 6.1, she falls behind the other
9Provided m > 2; if m = 2, any rule reduces to plurality.
10They can coexist for other scoring rules (Cahan and Slinko, 2016) outside the class of best-
worst rules.
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n1 − 1 candidates originally at x
1, thus losing their positive votes. On the other
hand, 1 rises ahead of these n1 − 1 candidates in the rankings of all other voters
and, in particular, no longer receives a negative vote from any voter. Then, the
score candidate 1 loses by making this move is vlost =
1
n1
ℓ(I1). On the other
hand, 1’s gain from this move is vgained =
1
n1
cℓ(I2).
For NCNE, it must be the case that vlost ≥ vgained, or ℓ(I1) ≥ cℓ(I2). Since
we assume c ≥ 1, this implies that ℓ(I1) ≥ ℓ(I2), or x
1 ≥ 1 − (x1 + xq)/2.
Similar considerations with respect to candidate q yields the requirement that
ℓ([xq, 1]) ≥ ℓ([0, (x1 + xq)/2], or 1 − xq ≥ (x1 + xq)/2. Together, these two
conditions imply that x1 ≥ xq, an impossibility for an NCNE.
Before we proceed to our characterisation, some additional notation. Let
(i) I1 = [0, (x
1 + x2)/2],
(ii) Ii = [(x
i−1 + xi)/2, (xi + xi+1)/2] for 2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1,
(iii) Iq = [(x
q−1 + xq)/2, 1],
be the “full-electorates” corresponding each occupied position. A full-electorate
Ii is the set of voters for whom a given occupied position x
i is the nearest, so
that any candidates located there are ranked first equal for these voters. For
each i ∈ [q] let ILi = {y ∈ Ii : y ≤ x
i} and IRi = {y ∈ Ii : y ≥ x
i} be the
left and right “half-electorates” whose union is the full-electorate Ii. That is, we
simply partition a full-electorate into those voters whose ideal positions lie to the
left of the given occupied position and those who lie to the right. We note that
ℓ(IRi ) = ℓ(I
L
i+1) for i ∈ [q − 1].
We now present our characterisation of NCNE for best-worst rules, Theo-
rem 4.3, which provides five necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile to
be an NCNE for a given best-worst rule. Condition (i) states that the out-
ermost occupied positions must be occupied by two candidates apiece. It is
clear that they cannot be single candidates, but this condition also excludes the
possibility of more than two candidates, as in the well-known case of plurality
(see Eaton and Lipsey, 1975). The second condition says that all paired candi-
dates’ half-electorates are the same length, excluding end electorates, while (iii)
relates these interior half-electorates to the outermost half-electorates. Condi-
tions (iv) and (v) put restrictions on the lengths of various electorates: first, an
unpaired candidate’s full-electorate cannot be smaller than any half-electorate
(excluding end half-electorates); and, second, a paired candidate’s half-electorate
cannot be smaller than an unpaired candidate’s half-electorate (excluding end
half-electorates).
An important observation to make is that, with the exception of (iii), all the
remaining conditions are identical for any rule—they do not depend directly on
c, as long as c < 1. Condition (iii) demonstrates that the equilibrium spacing of
the candidates will be affected by c, but not the configuration of candidates (i.e.,
the number of occupied positions and how many candidates occupy them). Thus,
if they exist (we will see shortly that they do for any rule with c < 1), NCNE for
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best-worse rules will have the same general form as NCNE for plurality, the only
difference being the exact location of x1, . . . , xq.
Theorem 4.3. Given a rule s = (c,m), with c < 1, the following conditions are
necessary and sufficient for a profile x to be an NCNE:
(i) ni ≤ 2 for all i ∈ [q] and n1 = nq = 2. That is, candidates at the most
extreme occupied positions are paired.
(ii) If ni = 2 for 1 < i < q, then ℓ(I
L
i ) = ℓ(I
R
i ) = ℓ(I
R
1 ) = ℓ(I
L
q ). Let I
p denote
this common measure. That is, all paired candidates’ half-electorates are
the same length (except end half-electorates).
(iii) ℓ(IL1 ) = ℓ(I
R
q ) = I
p + c2 .
(iv) If ni = 1, then both ℓ(Ii) ≥ ℓ(I
L
k ) for all k 6= 1 and ℓ(Ii) ≥ ℓ(I
R
k ) for all
k 6= q. That is, any (unpaired) candidate’s full-electorate is no smaller than
any other half-electorate (excluding end half-electorates).
(v) Ip ≥ ℓ(ILk ) for all k 6= 1 and I
p ≥ ℓ(IRk ) for all k 6= q. That is, a paired can-
didate’s half-electorate (excluding end half-electorates) is no smaller than
any other (unpaired) candidate’s half-electorate (excluding the end half-
electorates).
Proof. That (i) is necessary follows from Lemma 6.4, so we start by showing the
necessity of (ii). Suppose candidate j is at xi, where ni = 2 and suppose without
loss of generality that ℓ(ILi ) > ℓ(I
R
i ). Then vj(x
i−, x−j) = ℓ(I
L
i ) > ℓ(I
R
i ) =
vj(x
i+, x−j), contradicting Lemma 6.2. So ℓ(I
L
i ) = ℓ(I
R
i ). Let I
p denote this
common measure. Moreover, note that v1(x
1+, x−1) = ℓ(I
R
1 ). Using Lemmas
6.2 and 6.3, we know v1(x
1+, x−i) = v1(x) = vj(x) = I
p, so that ℓ(IR1 ) = I
p.
Similarly, ℓ(ILq ) = I
p. Hence, condition (ii) is necessary.
Now condition (iii). Note that we must have ℓ(IL1 ) = ℓ(I
R
q ). Otherwise, if
ℓ(IL1 ) > ℓ(I
R
q ), then, using Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3,
vq(x) = v1(x) = v1(x
1−, x−1) > vq(x
q+, x−q) = vq(x),
a contradiction. Thus, (x1 + xq)/2 = 1/2. Hence, v1(x) =
1
2(ℓ(I1) + I
p) − c4 ,
which, by Lemma 6.2, is equal to v1(x
1+, x−1) = I
p, so ℓ(IL1 ) = I
p + c2 .
Now conditions (iv) and (v). Let candidate l be at xi. Then, if ni = 1, we
have vl(x) = ℓ(Ii). Suppose there is some k > 1 such that ℓ(Ii) < ℓ(I
L
k ). Clearly
the half electorate ILk could not be i’s half electorate, i.e. k = i or k = i+ 1. So
we have
vl(x
k−, x−l) = ℓ(I
L
k ) > ℓ(Ii) = vl(x),
so this is not an NCNE. So we must have ℓ(ILk ) ≤ ℓ(Ii). For (v), if ni = 2, then
(noting that i can be 1 or q since all paired candidates receive the same score by
Lemma 6.3) vl(x) = I
p, which, to avoid contradiction, implies Ip ≥ ℓ(ILk ) for all
k 6= 1. Similarly for right electorates.
Now sufficiency. We need to check that no candidate can deviate profitably.
Consider candidate i at xj, where nj = 2 (i could be an end candidate). We know
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that all paired candidates get the same score, vi(x) = I
p, and that vi(x
1−, x−1) =
vi(x), so i would not want to deviate to x
1− or xq+. Also, if t ∈ (xk, xk+1) for
some k < q, then vi(t, x−1) = ℓ(I
R
k ) ≤ I
p = vi(x) by condition (v). Candidate i
would also not deviate to an occupied position xk, k 6= j. Doing so would yield
a score of vi(x
k, x−i) =
2
3I
p < vi(x) if nk = 2 or a score of vi(x
k, x−i) =
1
2ℓ(Ik) =
1
2 (ℓ(I
L
k ) + ℓ(I
R
k )) ≤ I
p = vi(x) if nk = 1, by (v). So no paired candidates would
deviate.
Consider an unpaired candidate i at position xj . Then vi(x) = ℓ(Ij). Clearly
any moves within the interval (xj−1, xj+1) do not change i’s score. Suppose t ∈
(xk, xk+1) for some k /∈ {j − 1, j, q}. Then vi(t, x−i) = ℓ(I
R
k ) ≤ ℓ(Ij) = vi(x), so i
will not move to any unoccupied position. Suppose nk = 2 and k /∈ {j−1, j+1}.
Then vi(x
k, x−i) =
2
3I
p < Ip ≤ ℓ(Ij) = vi(x), by (iv). Suppose nk = 1 and
k /∈ {j − 1, j + 1}. Then vi(x
k, x−i) =
1
2(ℓ(I
L
k ) + ℓ(I
R
k )) ≤ ℓ(Ij) = vi(x). So no
unpaired candidate wants to deviate to any occupied position that is not adjacent
to the candidate’s current position.
Finally, we check that no unpaired candidate would move to an adjacent oc-
cupied position. If nj−1 = 2, j − 1 6= 1, then vi(x
j−1, x−i) =
1
3(I
p + ℓ(Ij)) ≤
2
3ℓ(Ij) < ℓ(Ij) = vi(x). If j − 1 = 1 then vi(x
j−1, x−i) =
1
3 (ℓ(I
L
1 ) + ℓ(Ij)) −
c
6 =
1
3
(
Ip + c2 + ℓ(Ij)
)
− c6 ≤
2
3ℓ(Ij) < ℓ(Ij) = vi(x). If nj−1 = 1, then vi(x
j−1, x−i) =
1
2 (ℓ(I
L
j−1)+ℓ(Ij)) ≤ ℓ(Ij) = vi(x). So no unpaired candidate wants to move to the
next left occupied position or, by similar arguments, to the next right occupied
position. We have checked all possible deviations, so x is a NCNE.
While Theorem 4.3 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an NCNE, it
is not yet clear that these conditions can be satisfied for an arbitrary number of
candidates and any c < 1. The next result addresses this question and shows
that they do indeed exist for any m 6= 3.
Corollary 4.4. For all m ≥ 2, except for m = 3, NCNE exist for rules s =
(c,m) with c < 1, and for m ≥ 6 there are infinitely many NCNE for a given
rule. Moreover, all NCNE take the same general form as plurality (they have
NCNE with the same number of occupied positions, q, with the same number of
candidates, ni, at each one, but perhaps different locations).
Proof. For m = 3, nonconvergent equilibria cannot exist by the familiar argu-
ment (Eaton and Lipsey, 1975) that one of them would have to be alone at an
outermost occupied position, and would have an incentive to move inwards.
Considerm ≥ 4. Suppose candidates are positioned so that all half-electorates
have the same length, except for end electorates, and n1 = nq = 2. That is,
ℓ(ILk ) = ℓ(I
R
j ) = I
p for all k 6= 1, j 6= q. Then, we place x1 and xq so that (iii) is
satisfied, from which it follows that Ip = 12q (1 − c). By construction, then, (iv)
and (v) are satisfied, and we have an NCNE.
Next, we show that there are infinitely many NCNE for m ≥ 6. If m is even,
construct a profile as above, but with q = (m + 2)/2 occupied positions, all of
them occupied by two candidates except for the two innermost positions, xk and
xk+1, which are occupied by only one candidate each, and all half-electorates
except for the outermost of the same length. This will be an equilibrium by the
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argument of the previous paragraph, with x1 and xq chosen to satisfy (iii). Let
us increase the length of each half-electorate except for IRk and I
L
k+1 by ǫ > 0,
so that Ip
′
= Ip + ǫ (that is, we are moving all positions inwards at the expense
of the interior two candidates). This maintains (i)-(iii). Condition (iv) will still
be satisfied since the only unpaired candidates are those at xk and xk+1, who
have full-electorates of length ℓ(Ik) = I
p′ + ℓ(IRk ) > max{I
p′ , ℓ(IRk )}. Clearly, (v)
will still be satisfied, since we are increasing the length of Ip and decreasing the
length IRk and I
L
k+1.
If there is an odd number of candidates m ≥ 7 we can do a similar thing. We
start with q = (m+3)/2 occupied positions, symmetric about the median, which
is occupied by a single candidate. The two innermost occupied positions to the
left and right of the median are also occupied by single candidates. Label the
occupied position at the median as xk. All occupied positions other than these
three have two candidates apiece, and we place them so that all half-electorates
except the outermost are of the same length. Again, choose x1 and xq so that
(iii) is satisfied. Now, increase the length of all half-electorates except for ILk
and IRk by ǫ > 0. As above, this maintains (i)-(iii). Condition (iv) will clearly
still be satisfied for all i 6= k. For Ik, the full electorate is getting smaller, but
ℓ(Ik) = 2I
p − Jǫ > Ip + ǫ for small ǫ, where J is the number of half intervals to
one side of the median that increase in length. Condition (v) will still be satisfied,
since the paired candidates’ half-electorates Ip are increasing in length, while the
unpaired candidates’ half-electorates are either increasing at the same rate, or
getting smaller in the case of ILk and I
R
k .
An important consequence of Theorem 4.3 is that plurality rule produces the
most dispersed equilibria, while incorporating a negative vote pulls the platforms
inward. Essentially, the correct choice of c allows an election designer to pick any
level of dispersion between that of plurality and full convergence, an important
result given the tradeoff between moderation and representation discussed in the
Introduction. This is stated in Corollary 4.5.
Corollary 4.5. For a given configuration of candidates, i.e., fixing q and ni for
i ∈ [q], but allowing xi to vary, the most extreme equilibria occur under plurality.
Proof. Given a number of occupied positions q and the number of candidates ni
at each of them, maximising dispersion consists, essentially, in minimising the
location of x1. By (iii), then, we want to minimise Ip. Looking at condition (v),
we can see that we will want to to have ℓ(ILk ) = ℓ(I
R
k ) = I
p, which will then
imply that (iv) is satisfied. This will partition the issue space into 2q intervals
Ip and two intervals of length c/2. Thus, 2qIp + c = 1, so that Ip = 12q (1 − c)
and, hence, x1 = 12q (1+ c(q− 1)). Increasing c, then, increases x
1, leading to less
dispersed equilibria.
In the case of four or five candidates, there is a unique NCNE.
Corollary 4.6. If m = 4, then there is a unique NCNE, given by profile x =
((x1, 2), (1−x1 , 2)), where x1 = 14(1+c). If m = 5, then there is a unique NCNE,
given by profile x = ((x1, 2), (1/2, 1), (1 − x1, 2)), where x1 = 16(1 + 2c).
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In the four- and five-candidate cases, as expected by Corollary 4.5, the amount
of dispersion observed in the candidates’ positions depends on the value of c and is
maximal when the rule is plurality. As c grows towards 1, the positions converge
at the median voter position. As c increases beyond this point, by Cox’s (1987)
characterisation of CNE, we know that infinitely many CNE are possible in an
interval that becomes increasingly wide. Hence, there is a bifurcation point that
divides CNE from NCNE when c = 1. As we move away from this point, more
extreme positions are possible—on one side they take the form of CNE, and on
the other side they are NCNE.
The six candidate case admits infinitely many equilibria for a given rule, but
the pattern is similar.
c = 0 •
• • • •
•
c = 0.25 •
• • • •
•
c = 0.5 •
• • • •
•
c = 0.75 •• • • •
•
c = 1
•
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 1: Maximally dispersed NCNE for different choices of c.
c = 0 •
•
•
•
•
•
c = 0.25 •
•
•
•
•
•
c = 0.5 •
•
•
•
•
•
c = 0.75 •• •
•
•
•
c = 1
•
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 2: Minimally dispersed NCNE for different choices of c.
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Example. With six candidates, there are two possible configurations in an
NCNE: we can have three occupied positions with two candidates apiece; or, we
can have four occupied positions where the inner two positions are occupied by
single candidates. Consider the latter profile first—the former will turn out to
be a limiting case of the latter. If (i)-(iii) of Theorem 4.3 are satisfied, condition
(iv) will always be true, since the unpaired candidate at x2 has full-electorate
length ℓ(I2) = I
p + ℓ(IR2 ), which is clearly larger than all other half-electorates
excluding end electorates, which are of length either Ip or ℓ(IR2 ) = ℓ(I
L
3 ). Thus,
the only restriction is condition (v).
To get a maximally dispersed equilibrium, we want Ip to be as small as pos-
sible, which means setting Ip = ℓ(IR2 ) = ℓ(I
L
3 ). This gives equilibrium profile
x = ((x1, 2), (x2, 1), (1−x2, 1), (1−x1, 2)) where x1 = 18(1+3c) and x
2 = 38 (1+c).
A number of these maximally dispersed equilibria are pictured in Figure 1 for a
few different values of c.
To obtain a minimally dispersed equilibrium, we want Ip to be as large as
possible. Condition (iv) will always be satisfied, while condition (v) will still be
satisfied if the length of the half-electorates IR2 and I
L
3 go to zero. There, the
interior two candidates converge at the median and we are left with minimally
dispersed equilibrium profile x = ((x1, 2), (1/2, 2), (1 − x1, 2)) where x1 = 16(1 +
2c). Thus, the equilibrium with three occupied positions is the limiting case of the
equilibria with four occupied positions. These equilibria are depicted in Figure
2.
5 Conclusion
Different voting systems provide political candidates with different incentives
and, hence, lead to different outcomes, not all of which are socially desirable.
One would usually want a voting system in which adopting extremist positions
is not encouraged while, at the same time, voters are presented with some choice
over the policies advocated by the candidates. We have shown that the class
of best-worst rules offers a solid middle ground when voters have one positive
vote and one negative vote with relatively smaller weight, i.e., so that one neg-
ative vote does not cancel out one positive vote. In particular, nonconvergent
equilibria exist, and candidates adopt diffferent platforms in a very similar way
to under plurality. Importantly, however, the strong best-rewarding incentives
of plurality are tempered by the need to avoid negative votes and, indeed, any
degree of dispersion between the extreme cases of plurality and full convergence
of antiplurality can be obtained for the correct weighting of the negative vote.
The need to avoid negative votes leads candidates to moderate their platforms,
but without sacrificing diversity entirely.
Though natural, best-worst rules have not been used in practice, as is the case
for many of the voting rules studied in the social choice literature. However, our
results provide evidence that this system is worthy of consideration and presents
several desirable properties.
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Future research should investigate the properties of best-worst voting rules in
more realistic spatial models with, for example, probabilistic voting or endogenous
candidacy.
6 Appendix
We include here a number of lemmata that are needed for our main results. Sev-
eral of these minor results are adapted from results in Cahan and Slinko (2016),
though similar conditions have appeared in various form in the previous literature
since at least Eaton and Lipsey (1975).
The first lemma tells us that the most extreme occupied positions cannot be
occupied by single candidates, and they cannot be located at the most extreme
points on the issue space.
Lemma 6.1 (Cahan and Slinko, 2016). In an NCNE, we must have n1, nq ≥ 2.
Moreover, no candidate may adopt the most extreme positions on the issue space.
That is, 0 < x1 and xq < 1.
Proof. Evidently, an unpaired candidate at x1 could move to the right and capture
a larger share of positive votes and, at the same time, reduce the number of
negative votes.
To see the second part, suppose x1 = 0. Then the at least two candidates at x1
are ranked last equal by a positive measure of voters in the interval (1− 12x
q, 1].
By moving to x1+, however, a candidate originally at x1 is no longer ranked last
by any voters, but still receives the same number of first-place rankings.
The next lemma puts a condition on the continuity of the function vi(t, x−i)
when, in equilibrium, i is at a position occupied by one other candidate and
makes a small deviation.
Lemma 6.2. Suppose at profile x candidate i is at xl and nl = 2. Then
vi(x
l−, x−i) + vi(x
l+, x−i) = 2vi(x). In particular, when x is in NCNE, we have
vi(x
l−, x−i) = vi(x
l+, x−i) = vi(x).
Proof. The issue space can be divided into subintervals of voters who all rank i
in the same position. The immediate interval around xl, Il = I
L
l ∪ I
R
l , is the set
of voters from which the candidate receives positive votes. Let J be the interval
of voters from which i receives negative votes. In particular, J is nonempty only
if l = 1 or l = q, and it is located at the opposite side of the issue space. Thus,
if l /∈ {1, q}, we have vi(x) =
1
2(ℓ(I
L
l ) + ℓ(I
R
l )). Then vi(x
l−, x−i) = ℓ(I
L
l ) and
vi(x
l+, x−i) = ℓ(I
R
l ). For NCNE, we need vi(x
l−, x−i) ≤ vi(x) and vi(x
l+, x−i) ≤
vi(x). Summing these inequalities, we need vi(x
l−, x−i) + vi(x
l+, x−i) ≤ 2vi(x).
This, in fact, turns out to be an equality, so that we must have vi(x
l−, x−i) =
vi(x
l+, x−i) = vi(x).
If l = 1 (symmetrically for l = q), we have vi(x) =
1
2 (ℓ(I
L
l ) + ℓ(I
R
l )) −
c
2ℓ(J).
Also, vi(x
l−, x−i) = ℓ(I
L
l ) − cℓ(J) and vi(x
l+, x−i) = ℓ(I
R
l ). As in the previous
case, summing the requirements that these two moves not be beneficial, we find
that vi(x
l−, x−i) = vi(x
l+, x−i) = vi(x).
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Lemma 6.3. If ni = nj = 2, then vi(x) = vj(x) in NCNE.
Proof. Let k be a candidate at xi and l be a candidate at xj. Note that if k moves
to xj+ or xj−, due to the nature of the voting rule, k receives exactly the same
score as l would recieve on moving to xj+ or xj−. So vk(x
j+, x−k) = vl(x
j+, x−l).
Then, if x is in NCNE, using Lemma 6.2 gives that vl(x) = vl(x
j+, x−l) =
vk(x
j+, x−k) ≤ vk(x). Similarly, vl(x
i+, x−l) = vk(x
i+, x−k), from which it follows
that vk(x) = vk(x
i+, x−k) = vl(x
i+, x−l) ≤ vl(x). So vk(x) = vl(x).
Next, we note that there cannot be more than two candidates at any position.
In particular, this implies that there cannot exist NCNE for m = 3, a well known
result.
Lemma 6.4. In any NCNE, at any given position there are no more than two
candidates. Moreover, n1 = nq = 2.
Proof. By Corollary 4.2 we have to consider only the case when c < 1.
First, we show that, in NCNE, ni ≤ 2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. If ni > 2, where
2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, then candidate k, located at xi is not ranked last by any voter.
Moreover, she is not ranked last by any voter even on deviating to xi+ or xi−.
So the only change in her score on making these moves is from voters in the
immediate subintervals I1 = [(x
i−1+xi)/2, xi] and I2 = [x
i, (xi+xi+1)/2], where
voters change candidate k from first equal to first, and from first equal to nith,
respectively.
In NCNE we must have
vk(x
i−, x−k)− vk(x) = ℓ(I1)−
1
ni
(ℓ(I1) + ℓ(I2)) ≤ 0
and
vk(x
i+, x−k)− vk(x) = ℓ(I2)−
1
ni
(ℓ(I1) + ℓ(I2)) ≤ 0.
Adding together these two inequalities we get the requirement that ni ≤ 2.
To show that n1 = nq = 2, let us introduce the following notation: I1 = [0, x
1],
the voters to the left of candidate 1 (note that by Lemma 6.1, this set has positive
measure); I2 = [x
1, (x1+x2)/2], the voters in half the interval between candidates
1 and 2; I3 = [(x
1 + xq)/2, 1], the voters for whom 1 is ranked last equal.
Note that v1(x) =
1
n1
(ℓ(I1) + ℓ(I2)) −
c
n1
ℓ(I3). Consider if 1 moves to x
1−.
Then v1(x
1−, x−1) = ℓ(I1)− cℓ(I3)). If 1 moves to x
1+ then v1(x
1+, x−1) = ℓ(I2).
For NCNE we require that these moves not be beneficial to candidate 1. That
is, v1(x
1−, x−1) ≤ v1(x) which implies we need
ℓ(I1)− cℓ(I3)) ≤
1
n1
(ℓ(I1) + ℓ(I2))−
c
n1
ℓ(I3),
or (
1−
1
n1
)
cℓ(I3) ≥ ℓ(I1)−
1
n1
(ℓ(I1) + ℓ(I2)). (1)
Similarly, for the other move we have v1(x
1+, x−1) ≤ v1(x) which gives us
ℓ(I2) ≤
1
n1
(ℓ(I1) + ℓ(I2))−
c
n1
ℓ(I3),
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implying
(
1−
1
n1
)
cℓ(I3) ≤
(
1−
1
n1
)
(ℓ(I1) + ℓ(I2))− (n1 − 1)ℓ(I2).
Combining this last equation with (1) yields (2 − n1)ℓ(I2) ≥ 0, which means
n1 ≤ 2. Hence, n1 = 2, since we cannot have a lone candidate at x
1. A similar
argument gives nq = 2.
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